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WORKERS' COMPENSATION-STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ON
SEEKING ADDITIONAL BENEFITS. Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson,
265 Ark. 16, 576 S.W.2d 216 (1979).
Jerry Thompson, while employed by Mohawk Rubber Com-
pany, sustained a work-related injury to his foot on August 31,
1971. The injury was compensable under the Arkansas Workers'
Compensation Act' and Thompson received temporary and perma-
nent disability benefits until August 24, 1972. He was released
from treatment and was furnished with a pair of orthopedic shoes
on August 10, 1973. Mohawk's insurance carrier paid the last medi-
cal bill connected with Thompson's compensation award on De-
cember 13, 1973.
Despite the medical treatment described above, Thompson
continued to suffer pain and discomfort from the original injury to
his foot and subsequently underwent surgery. He filed a claim with
the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission on May 27,
1975, for the cost of surgery and for temporary and permanent dis-
ability benefits. Mohawk controverted the claim, contending that
the statute of limitations had run." The employer argued that the
words of the statute, "filed ... within one [1] year from the date
of the last payment of compensation"8 barred this claim. The Ar-
1. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-1301 to -1363 (1976).
2. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1318(b) (1976) provides:
In cases where compensation for disability has been paid on account of injury, a
claim for additional compensation shall be barred unless filed with the Commis-
sion within one [1] year from the date of the last payment of compensation, or two
[2] years from the date of the injury, whichever is greater. The time limitations of
this subsection shall not apply to claims for replacement of medicine, crutches,
artificial limbs and other apparatus permanently or indefinitely required as the
result of a compensable injury, where the employer or carrier previously furnished
such medical supplies.
3. Id. Since this case turns upon the statute of limitations section, the chronological
sequence of events is very important. For purposes of clarity, these are the dates which the
court found to be pertinent:
Aug. 31, 1971 - Original injury.
Aug. 24, 1972 - Expiration of benefits.
Aug. 10, 1973 - Released from medical treatment and furnished with orthopedic
shoes.
Nov. 8, 1973 - Carrier paid for shoes.
Dec. 13, 1973 - Carrier paid the physician's bill.
Aug. 28, 1974 - Second pair of orthopedic shoes was furnished.
May 27, 1975 - Claim for additional benefits was filed.
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kansas Workers' Compensation Commission ruled the claim was
not barred by the limitations period because the insurance carrier
furnished a replacement pair of orthopedic shoes approximately
nine months before the contested claim was filed. This action
tolled the statute for Thompson's claim for additional compensa-
tion. The Commission awarded compensation and the decision was
affirmed in circuit court. On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the furnishing of a replacement pair of or-
thopedic shoes did not toll the statute of limitations for the pur-
pose of filing a claim for additional compensation. Mohawk Rubber
Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 576 S.W.2d 216 (1979).
Workers' compensation statutes exist in every state and each
act contains a statute of limitations.' In addition, most statutes al-
low the claimant to reopen his case for the purpose of modifying
his compensation award." This right is also controlled by some
type of limitations period.' The length of the period varies widely
from state to state, ranging from the narrow view of limiting the
filing period for additional claims to the duration of the original
award,7 to a broader view that imposes no statutory time limit for
reopening claims.' Professor Larson, a leading scholar, prefers the
latter approach and suggests that there should be perpetual and
unlimited jurisdiction to reopen workers' compensation cases as
often as necessary to insure that the worker's award is adequate
for his current condition.' Most states, including Arkansas, have
rejected this idea.10 The Arkansas statute allows the worker to file
4. W. MALON, Tm EMPLOYMENT RELATION 461 (1974).
5. 3 A. LARSON, THE LAw OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 81.10 (1976). The need to
modify a compensation award usually arises when the employee decides that his award is
inadequate due to medical complications (Blount v. Industrial Comm'n, 19 Ariz. App. 245,
506 P.2d 285 (1973)), or when a latent injury is discovered (Sanderson & Porter v. Crow, 214
Ark. 416, 216 S.W.2d 796 (1949)), or when the claimant says that he was incapable of under-
standing the legal implications of the compensation award (Cook v. Brown, 246 Ark. 10, 436
S.W.2d 482 (1969)).
6. 3 A. LARSON, Tim LAw OF WomRME's COMPENSATION § 81.10 (1976).
7. Connecticut has adopted this view. Id. § 81.20.
8. Delaware, Georgia, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, North Dakota,
and Utah have adopted this view. Id.
9. Id. § 81.10.
10. Id. This may be due to administrative difficulties. Larson suggests that the pri-
mary problem is that the state would be required to maintain extensive case records for
indefinite periods. In addition, problems of proof would be encountered when adjudicating a
case where the injury occurred many years before. The idea is opposed by insurance carriers




a claim for additional compensation if it is filed within two years
from the date of the injury or one year from the date of the last
payment of compensation made under the original award.1
The Arkansas Supreme Court has interpreted the limitations
section for additional claims on several occasions.12 One common
issue involves the term "payment of compensation."" This re-
quires the court to decide exactly what activities by the employer
constitute a payment of compensation for purposes of tolling the
statute." Many activities have qualified, ranging from a payment
of medical expenses under a group hospitalization plan" to an em-
ployer's voluntary payment for a routine medical examination. 6 In
Ragon v. Great American Insurance Co., 17 the court held that for
purposes of computing attorneys' fees, the term "compensation"
should be interpreted to encompass all the items contained in sec-
tion 11 of the Workers' Compensation Act,' 8 which includes medi-
cal, surgical, hospital, and nursing services, plus medicine, crutch-
es, artificial limbs and other apparatus. This ruling provided a
more precise definition of compensation and also expanded the
scope of activities by the employer which could be construed as
compensation for the purpose of tolling the statute."
Once a transaction has been characterized as a payment of
compensation, the court is faced with a second issue concerning
the "date of the last payment."20 This requires the court to decide
the appropriate date on which the last payment of compensation
actually occurred.2' Some of these cases have been decided in the
11. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1318(b) (1976) See note 2 supra.
12. Id. See cases listed in the annotation.
13. Id. See note 2 supra.
14. This issue was presented in Mohawk Tire & Rubber Co. v. Brider, 257 Ark. 587,
518 S.W.2d 499 (1975).
15. Id.
16. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).
17. 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954).
18. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1311 (1976) provides in pertinent part: "Medical and hospi-
tal services and supplies. The employer shall promptly provide for an injured employee such
medical, surgical, hospital, and nursing services, and medicine, crutches, artificial limbs and
other apparatus as may be reasonably necessary for the treatment of the injury received by
the employee."
19. See, e.g., Heflin v. Pepsi Cola, 244 Ark. 195, 424 S.W.2d 365 (1968); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 391, 290 S.W.2d 211, 213 (1956).
20. See note 2 supra.
21. This issue was presented in Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Friar, 247 Ark. 98, 444
S.W.2d 556 (1969); Heflin v. Pepsi Cola, 244 Ark. 195, 424 S.W.2d 365 (1968); and Phillips v.
Bray, 234 Ark. 190, 351 S.W.2d 147 (1961).
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claimant's favor even though they could have been technically
barred by the limitations period."' A claim for additional compen-
sation will be rejected if it is clear that it was filed beyond the
limitations period.23 However, in accord with the general policy of
liberally interpreting the statute, 4 the court has been willing to
accept any reasonable argument by the claimant in determining
the date of the last payment, and in some cases has accepted a late
filing caused by administrative procedures beyond the claimant's
control.2
Despite this trend, the court rejected a claimant's attempt to
lengthen the limitations period in Heflin v. Pepsi Cola.26 In that
case the court held that the limitations period began on the date
that the medical services were furnished and not on the date when
the insurance carrier actually paid for the medical services.27 Pro-
fessor Larson agrees with the Arkansas position. His reasoning is
based on the idea that it is more logical to date the limitations
period from the receipt of services by the claimant than from the
receipt of payment by the doctor, since it is the relation between
the employee and the employer that is significant.28 The time when
the employer or his insurance carrier actually pays the doctor's bill
is a random element that could extend the period in a haphazard
manner bearing no relation to the purpose of the claims period.2 '
The Arkansas Legislature amended the statute of limitations
section of the Workers' Compensation Act in 1968.80 The amend-
ment made two changes in the statute.3 1 One change was the addi-
tion of the following sentence which qualifies the limitations period
for additional claims: "The time limitations of this subsection shall
22. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Jordan, 234 Ark. 339, 352 S.W.2d 75 (1961); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Brumley, 226 Ark. 388, 290 S.W.2d 211 (1956).
23. Industrial, Inc. v. Pierce, 263 Ark. 11, 563 S.W.2d 1 (1978); Phillips v. Bray, 234
Ark. 190, 351 S.W.2d 147 (1961); Key v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 228 Ark. 585, 309
S.W.2d 190 (1958).
24. Triebsch v. Athletic Mining & Smelting Co., 218 Ark. 379, 237 S.W.2d 26 (1951);
Stout Constr. Co. v. Wells, 214 Ark. 741, 217 S.W.2d 841 (1949).
25. Southern Cotton Oil Co. v. Friar, 247 Ark. 98, 444 S.W.2d 556 (1969); Jones Furni-
ture Mfg. Co. v. Evans, 244 Ark. 242, 424 S.W.2d 880 (1968). Contra, Superior Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Shelby, 265 Ark. 599, 580 S.W.2d 201 (1979).
26. 244 Ark. 195, 424 S.W.2d 365 (1968).
27. Id. at 198, 424 S.W.2d at 367.
28. 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 78.43(b) (1976).
29. Id.
30. 1968 Ark. Acts 1. (codified at ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1318(b) (1976)).
31. Id.
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not apply to claims for replacement of medicine, crutches, artificial
limbs, and other apparatus permanently or indefinitely required as
the result of a compensable injury, where the employer or carrier
previously furnished such medical supplies."82 This change may
have resulted from the 1967 case of Shelby Electric Co. v. Duran.8 s
In Duran the court held that an employee's claim for a replace-
ment pair of orthopedic shoes was barred by statute' since the
claim was filed one year and forty-four days after the last payment
of the original award. Justice Smith and Justice Fogleman voted
with the majority in Duran, but joined in a concurring opinion s5 in
which they stated the result in Duran was inequitable. They be-
lieved that an injured worker should be entitled to replacement of
apparatus (crutches, artificial limbs, etc.) which are needed as a
result of an original compensable injury6 The justices stated that
the purpose of the statute of limitations was to put "stale demands
at rest,'87 that this purpose was not fulfilled in this situation, and
that a legislative change in the statute was needed to prevent simi-
lar results in the future."8
In Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson the court was required to
decide the date of the last compensation payment of the original
award. The court agreed with the employer's contention that the
statute was tolled from the date the employee was released from
medical treatment, not the date the insurance carrier paid for the
medical services,89 basing its decision on the Heflin case.' 0 With
this rule in mind, the court found there had been no tolling of the
statute between August 10, 1973, when Thompson was released
32. See note 2 supra.
33. 243 Ark. 344, 419 S.W.2d 798 (1967).
34. See note 2 supra.
35. Shelby Elec. Co. v. Duran, 243 Ark. 344, 356, 419 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1967).
36. It should be noted that the claimant in Duran was not attempting to expand the
amount or the scope of his award, but was only attempting to replace a part of his original
award (a pair of orthopedic shoes) which had been worn out.
37. Shelby Elec. Co. v. Duran, 243 Ark. 344, 356, 419 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1967).
38. Since there is no set procedure for recording legislative history in Arkansas, it is
hard to validate a connection between the Duran case and the 1968 amendment which fol-
lowed it. However, the language of the Smith concurrence and the short time period be-
tween the 1967 Duran case and the 1968 amendment suggest that the legislature was influ-
enced by Judge Smith's reasoning and in fact responded to his call for a legislative change.
The concurrence ended with the following language: "In the circumstances the controlling
statute might well be amended. This concurring opinion is intended merely to call the mat-
ter to the attention of the General Assembly." Id. at 347, 419 S.W.2d at 800.
39. Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 18, 576 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1979).
40. Heflin v. Pepsi Cola, 244 Ark. 195, 197, 424 S.W.2d 365, 366 (1968).
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from treatment, and August 28, 1974, when Thompson received a
replacement pair of orthopedic shoes.41 The claim for additional
compensation filed on May 27, 1975, was barred. 2
Secondly, the court had to determine what constituted "pay-
ment of compensation" in light of the 1968 amendment of the stat-
ute. The Arkansas Workers' Compensation Commission ruled that
the statute of limitations for additional compensation was tolled
when the employer furnished the second pair of orthopedic shoes
on August 28, 1974,"8 basing its decision on the definition of com-
pensation announced in the Ragon case." Since orthopedic shoes
fall within the Ragon definition, the Commission concluded that
the furnishing of orthopedic shoes amounted to "payment of com-
pensation." This would extend for one year the period in which the
claimant could file a claim for additional benefits. Because Thomp-
son underwent surgery and filed his claim within the one year pe-
riod following the receipt of the replacement pair of orthopedic
shoes, the Commission granted his request for additional compen-
sation to cover the cost of the surgery."
The Arkansas Supreme Court found the Ragon decision was
not controlling in Mohawk, and reversed the Commission's deci-
sion.4 This ruling was based on the language added to section
18(b) of the Arkansas Workers' Compensation Act by the 1968
amendment.47 The court reasoned that the manifest purpose of
this amendment was to eliminate the statute of limitations re-
quirement with respect to an employee's right to obtain the re-
placement of medicine, crutches, artificial limbs and other appara-
tus that would be indefinitely required as a result of a compensable
injury.4' After determining that this was the sole purpose for the
amendment, the court held that the amendment was not intended
to lengthen the limitations period for additional compensation."
Characterizing the 1968 amendment as being an exception to the
basic limitations rule, the court found that the Commission had
extended the scope of the exception beyond the defect that it was
41. Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 18, 576 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1979).
42. Note 3 supra lists the pertinent dates in chronological order.
43. Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 18, 576 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1979).
44. Ragon v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 224 Ark. 387, 273 S.W.2d 524 (1954).
45. Mohawk Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 265 Ark. 16, 18, 576 S.W.2d 216, 217 (1979).
46. Id.
47. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-1318(b) (1976). See note 2 supra.




designed to correct.50 The operation of the 1968 amendment was
limited to claims for replacement materials and thus could not be
used in conjunction with the Ragon definition of compensation to
extend the statute of limitations period for a claim for additional
compensation."1
The Mohawk decision provides the first judicial interpretation
of the 1968 amendment to section 18(b) of the Workers' Compen-
sation Act. The court defined the extent to which a claimant could
use the 1968 amendment to extend the statute of limitations. For
example, prior to the 1968 amendment, the claimant in Mohawk
would have been unable to obtain the replacement orthopedic
shoes on August 28, 1974, because more than a year had passed
since he had been furnished medical services on August 10, 1973."
Before the 1968 amendment, an injured worker was required to file
a claim every year for the replacement apparatus needed as the
result of a compensable injury. It was necessary for the claimant to
do this even if that particular apparatus (crutch, artificial limb,
orthopedic shoes, etc.) was still in good working order, because a
failure to file a claim within one year would bar a claim which was
filed, for example, three years later when an actual need arose. The
1968 amendment will prevent the reoccurrence of the inequitable
result in Duran."
A strict application of the Ragon definition of compensation to
the operation of the 1968 amendment would mean that a new pe-
riod of limitations would begin to run each time the replacement
material was provided. The practical effect of this reasoning would
be to deny the defense of the statute of limitations to an employer
who provides replacement materials. This is a result which the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court would not allow.
Robert McCallum
50. Id. at 19, 576 S.W.2d at 218.
51. Id. at 18, 576 S.W.2d at 217.
52. Id.
53. In his dissent, Justice Jones indicated that the statute as it appeared in 1967
should have entitled a worker to receive replacement crutches and other apparatus needed
as a result of a compensable injury. Later in his opinion, he stated, "Certainly the furnishing
of such apparatus by the employer should not toll the statute of limitations on a claim for
additional compensation or for medical or hospital treatment .... ." Shelby Elec. Co. v.
Duran, 243 Ark. 344, 347, 419 S.W.2d 798, 800 (1967). This comment is purely dictum, but
appears to address a situation such as that presented in Mohawk.
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